EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator presents discussion paper, implementation report on the EU strategy and action plan to combat terrorism

December 3, 2009 by Infowars Ireland

The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator produced a far-reaching discussion paper which describes the changing nature of the threat from terrorism in EU, reconfirms the validity of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism strategy, and set out some key challenges which need to be addressed in the future.

1. The threat

De Kerckhove warned about a growing sense of ‘CT Fatigue’, saying that “the fact that an incident on the scale of 7/7 has not happened again in Europe does not mean that Al Qaeda or other militant groups have not been trying.” He also noted that while militant Islamist terrorism today still constitutes the biggest threat facing Europe as a whole, “a number of Member States continue to face their own indigenous terrorist problems, and we should not lose sight of the longer term possibility that other fringe groups could resort to political violence on a European scale as has happened in the past.”

The coordinator used a bon mot from the US to describe another evolving threat the EU is facing now:

The emergence of self-starting “lone wolves” (or small groups) that have no organisational connections, but work entirely from material they find for themselves on the internet is a particular example. (…) Terrorist attacks happen when intent meets capability. We need to work on both sides of this equation.

2. The EU CT Strategy – 10 key challenges

It has been the long-standing policy of the EU to treat Terrorism as crime, to be tackled within the framework of criminal law. This approach has many obvious advantages, not least the fact that it helps de-glamorise the terrorists. The “prisoners of war” in Guantanamo are a staple of Al Qaeda propaganda, convicted prisoners in European jails do not get a mention.

The Coordinator then sums up 10 key challenges for Europe:

1. We need to do more to support the victims of terrorism. (No elaboration is given on how this could be achieved however.)

2. Human Rights.

While it is very welcome that this topic features so high on the agenda, the elaboration of the theme is somewhat cryptically formulated and focuses on the transatlantic relationship.

We need to maintain broad support for the fight against terrorism both within the EU, and internationally. Crucial to this is making the case that effective counter terrorism measures and the promotion of human rights really are mutually reinforcing goals. Most importantly, the transatlantic relationship will remain crucial to Europe’s security and the approach of the new US Administration, strongly motivated by human rights concerns, is a significant opportunity to deepen the EU – US partnership. We need to lay the basis for this by concluding an agreement on data protection and data sharing, as well as a robust long term agreement to support the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. A set of common principles in the fight against terrorism, as proposed in the EU-US Statement on Guantanamo could reinforce the legal foundation for our joint efforts. These efforts should focus not only on creating our own common space of justice and security, but we should also work together more in third countries and international institutions to expand that space of justice and security more widely. We need to maintain the consensus in the UN behind the global CT strategy, and develop it further, for example through the CCITF.

3. The EU needs to intensify and broaden its ‘Prevent Work’ without stigmatising any community.

In what could be interpreted as a disguised critique of the UK’s Prevent Programme the Coordinator also says that: “Cross-cultural dialogue, community cohesion and participation have an obvious CT dividend, but this is devalued if CT is seen as the main driver.”

The Coordinator singles out The Netherlands as a country of ‘best practice’ in this area:

This is a field where we rely heavily on Member States to take the lead. A number have already done so as “lead countries” for particular strands of work as set out in my previous reports. In going forward, I would like to highlight the Netherlands, who with a concrete and practical focus on the role of local actors have created a de-facto experience-sharing network of the local actors from some ten Member States. It is through this kind of sharing of best practices and concrete operational tools that we need to proceed. Only by building upon the first-hand experience of local professionals – be they teachers, youth workers, police officers or community liaison officers – will we deal with the reality on the ground. Indeed, we need more of a multi-disciplinary approach to fully grasp the challenges and to identify real responses.

4. Development and Security

This paragraph will also raise some eyebrows amongst anti-’securitization’ academics:

Without security, development is impossible, for example we cannot achieve targets for female education if terrorists burn down all the schools which admit women. This is increasingly recognised by the development community, but there is still a reluctance to use aid money to tackle the security challenges facing these countries. We need to work to make sure the causes of insecurity and conflict are taken more into account in developing programmes to support sustainable development.

5. New legal instruments are needed based on mutual recognition allowing for the collection of evidence in cross border investigations, and covering all forms of investigative measures.
Here comes the most controversial part. The EU Coordinator states:

We should also examine the need to adopt common legislation on new investigation techniques (e.g. on line computer search). Other challenges include the need to think about the correct legal framework to tackle “participation” in terrorist groups when such groups are loose or even have at best a virtual existence (as with the “lone wolf”); and whether going to a terrorist training camp abroad should be made an offence as it has in some Member States.

6. Information Management and Data Protection: all EU countries need to have a fusion centers + the EU needs to have its own PNR and TFTP

Far reaching proposals are made here as well:

We need to improve the way in which Member States are feeding information to Europol and Eurojust. All Member States should also have a national fusion centre and we should set up a network connecting them.

This is also quite a controversial measure as many privacy advocates are vehemently opposed to the creation of such centers. Then:

Depending on the findings of the EU Information Management Strategy and the lessons learned from national experience with PNR systems, we should examine in this context the need for an EU PNR, and the possibility of an EU Terrorist Tracking Financial Programme (TFTP). An added benefit of developing our own European PNR (or even TFTP) models would be the development of a more equal partnership with the US.

7. Soft targets

The Coordinator calls for intensifying work on aviation and maritime security, in close cooperation with transport operators in order to mitigate the impact on the travelling public (e.g. to find ways in which we can resume allowing liquids to be taken on planes). Mass-events need to be secured as well.

8. Extend the Directive on the protection of critical infrastructure to cyberspace

We need to think about what in today’s world constitutes “critical infrastructure” and extend the Directive on the protection of critical infrastructures accordingly. More widely there is a need to ensure overall coordination of the various aspects of the fight against terrorism in cyberspace. This needs to be seen not only as critical infrastructure, but also as an arena for the propaganda war and for recruitment to terrorism), a space in which terrorists need to be tracked and monitored, the venue for cybercrime and potentially also for targeted attacks (cyber-warfare). We need to balance citizens legitimate expectations of privacy in the virtual world with the ability to track those who mean serious harm (eg in the regulation of encryption).

9. Public Private Partnerships

10. Security-related research

Unlike the military, law enforcement does not have a tradition of forward planning for its future requirements from technology. The market for internal security products in Europe remains highly fragmented. It would help law enforcement, and also help create a stronger European security industry if we could develop and expand a genuine dialogue on future technology needs in the field of internal security. The ESRIF report provides a good basis for this. We should also reinforce the European Network of Internal Security Technology Departments, and seek to increase the synergies in the field of research between Defence and Internal Security.

Overview of the implementation by EU member states of the legislative Instruments listed in the Declaration on terrorism of the European Council of 25 March 2004 and subsequent major instruments identified by the United Nations here.

Action plan to counter terrorism here.